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Abstract Understanding others’ feelings, intentions, and be-
liefs is a crucial social skill both for our personal lives and for
meeting the challenges of a globalized world. Recent evidence
suggests that the ability to represent and infer others’ mental
states (Theory of Mind, ToM) can be enhanced by mental
training in healthy adults. The present study investigated the
role of training-induced understanding of oneself for the en-
hanced understanding of others. In a large-scale longitudinal
study, two independent participant samples (N = 80 and
N = 81) received a 3-month contemplative training. This train-
ing focused on perspective taking and was inspired by the
Internal Family Systems model that conceives the self as be-
ing composed of a complex system of inner personality as-
pects. Specifically, participants practiced perspective taking
on their own inner states by learning to identify and classify
different inner personality parts. Results revealed that the de-
gree to which participants improved their understanding of
themselves—reflected in the number of different inner parts
they could identify—predicted their improvements in high-
level ToM performance over training. Especially the number
of identified parts that were negatively valenced showed a
strong relation with enhanced ToM capacities. This finding
suggests a close link between getting better in understanding
oneself and improvement in social intelligence.
Keywords Internal Family System . Theory ofMind . Self .
Inner parts . Contemplative mental training
Introduction
As citizens of the twenty-first century, we face many problems
of an industrialized and globalized world. Tensions between
countries, cultures, and religions are rising; wars and political
instabilities drive millions of people to leave their homes and
seek refuge; and the consequences of climate change become
ever more visible. Skillful solutions to these problems will
require cooperation across nationalities and cultures. In order
to achieve this goal, we need to put ourselves in the shoes of
others—considering the viewpoint of those who hold different
political and religious views and who are seeking shelter in our
countries as well as bearing in mind the needs of future gener-
ations. Taking the cognitive perspective of other people is rel-
evant for peaceful and successful interactions not only on an
inter-cultural scale, but also in families, schools, and work-
places, both when communicating with acquaintances and with
complete strangers. The importance of our ability to perceive
other people as thinking and feeling beings has been empha-
sized in developmental and clinical domains: Impaired interac-
tion and communication skills as well as aggressive and abu-
sive behaviors towards others, for instance, have repeatedly
been linked to reduced capacities or inclinations to take others’
perspectives into account (e.g., Fonagy 2003; Frith and Happe
1994). Also in healthy adult populations, research suggests that
taking others’ perspectives enhances cooperation (Paal and
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Bereczkei 2006), reduces stereotyping (Galinsky and
Moskowitz 2000; Todd et al. 2012), and widens our Bcircle
of moral regard^ to the inclusion of formerly stigmatized
groups (Batson et al. 1997). But how can we enhance this
capacity? And, more specifically, does the enhancement of a
better understanding of the self help better understanding
others?
The socio-cognitive ability to take other people’s perspec-
tive, to infer and reason about their mental states such as
thoughts, beliefs, and intentions, is referred to as Theory of
Mind (ToM), mentalizing or cognitive perspective taking
(Frith and Frith 2003; Premack and Woodruff 1978; Singer
2012). Over the last decades, neuroscientific research has re-
vealed that processing others’mental states leads to enhanced
activation in a network including temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, and medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Bzdok et al. 2012; Dodell-Feder
et al. 2011; Kanske et al. 2015; Schurz et al. 2014). This
cognitive route to understanding others has been distinguished
from an affective route to understanding others (i.e., empathic
sharing of another’s bodily or emotional state; Vignemont and
Singer 2006) both on the level of brain and behavior (Kanske
et al. 2015; Kanske et al. 2016; Lamm et al. 2011; Singer
2006). A main focus of research on ToM has been the ques-
tions whether and to what degree the ability to represent con-
specifics’mental states is also present in our closest biological
relatives—chimpanzees (Premack and Woodruff 1978), at
what age children develop this capacity (Wellman and Estes
1986), and how this capacity is impaired in psychopathologies
such as autism (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Bird et al. 2010;
Frith and Happe 1994; Hoffmann et al. 2015; for a review,
see Singer 2012).
In addition, previous studies have shown that cognitive
perspective taking trainings that entail explicit familiarization
with the concept of mental states and the practice of
mentalizing tasks can promote the development of ToM ca-
pacity in children (Ding et al. 2015; Lecce et al. 2014a, b) and
slow down the decline of ToM performance in the elderly
(Cavallini et al. 2015; Henry et al. 2013). Initial evidence
suggests that even in healthy adults, meditation-based train-
ings can improve the understanding of emotional expressions
(assessed by the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test; Mascaro
et al. 2013; Schurz et al. 2014). Crucially, recent evidence
from the ReSource Project, a large-scale longitudinal training
study (Singer et al. 2016), showed reliable increase in high-
level ToM performance in healthy adult populations after
3 months of mental training in metacognition and perspective
taking (Trautwein et al. under review) in an ecologically valid
task (EmpaToM, see Kanske et al. 2015).
However, the underlying mechanisms for these promising
changes in ToM performance are still poorly understood. In the
present study, we therefore investigated how practicing the
ability to understand one’s own mental states, which was part
of the above-mentioned perspective training, relates to the ob-
served improvements in ToM. Common sense and established
sayings clearly advocate that Byou have to know yourself to
know others.^ More generally, decades of social neuroscience
research in the domain of empathy, action understanding, and
mentalizing suggest that understanding others’ feelings, ac-
tions, or even mental states rely on activating representations
necessary to understand your own feelings (Singer 2012), ac-
tions (Keysers and Gazzola 2009), or mental states (Mitchell
2009). Neuroimaging studies show, for instance, that partly
similar brain areas are involved in reasoning about oneself
(e.g., on one’s personality traits) and reasoning about others
(e.g., mirror neuron systems, Gallese and Goldman 1998;
Goldman 2006; mPFC, TPJ, Lombardo et al. 2010; mPFC,
Mitchell and Phillips 2015). Similarly, in a review on theoret-
ical models and empirical data from neuroimaging and clinical
studies, Dimaggio et al. (2008) concluded that the capacities for
understanding oneself and others are Bsemi-independent skills^
which may enhance each other. So far, however, within-subject
data on the link between learning to take the perspective on
oneself and taking the cognitive perspective of others is lack-
ing, precluding any form of mechanistic interpretation of
existing neuroimaging findings of shared brain mechanisms
involved in mentalizing about self and others.
The question whether learning to understand oneself is re-
lated to improvements in ToM performance could be addressed
in the context of the aforementioned training study, the
ReSource Project (Singer et al. 2016). In this project, partici-
pants completed one or all of three distinct mental training
modules (each lasting for 3months), focusing on the cultivation
of attention and interoceptive awareness (BPresence Module^),
of socio-affective qualities such as care, compassion, gratitude,
and prosocial motivation (BAffect Module^), or of socio-
cognitive abilities such asmetacognition and perspective taking
on self and others (BPerspective Module^). Another partici-
pants sample served as retest controls and did not partake in
any training (see Fig. 1, panel a for an overview of the study
design). The present study focuses on the Perspective Module
because this module selectively induced significant increases in
ToM performance (Trautwein et al. under review).
During the Perspective Module, participants practiced two
core exercises (see Fig. 1, panel b). The first was anObserving-
thoughts meditation, a contemplative method aiming to foster
metacognitive awareness of and detachment from one’s think-
ing process (Ricard 2010). The second core exercise was a
contemplative dyad (Bperspective dyad,^ Kok and Singer
2017) that aimed to enhance the capacity of cognitive perspec-
tive taking on one’s own and others’ mental processes. This
contemplative dyadic practice is inspired by previous research
in ToM (for review see Singer 2012) and the Internal Family
Systems (IFS) model (Holmes 2011; Schwartz 2013; for prom-
ising results of a proof-of-concept study, see Shadick et al.
2013). The IFS model regards a person’s personality as
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composed of relatively discrete subpersonalities—inner
parts—each of which possesses its own characteristic set of
cognitions, affects, and behaviors (Schwartz 1995). In the con-
text of the ReSource Project, the IFSmodel was extracted from
its typical therapeutic context and implemented to allow par-
ticipants to identify and get to know different inner parts (as
forms of their own emotional, cognitive, or behavioral pat-
terns) (Kok and Singer 2017; Singer et al. 2016). Participants
were taught to identify their own inner parts, explored how
being identified with different inner parts affects their everyday
experiences, and learned to recognize other people’s inner parts
(for details, see method section).
Because such a contemplative approach to describing and
cultivating one’s own mental patterns by means of inner parts
is novel in psychological research, our first goal was to de-
scribe which types of inner parts participants came up with
and to validate this new approach by investigating how the
inner parts participants identified throughout the 3-month
Perspective Module related to established psychometric trait
affect measures. Since affective valence is one of the most
defining features of the inner parts (Holmes 2011; Schwartz
1995), the key question was whether the valence of partici-
pants’ parts reflected their trait affect assessed by trait ques-
tionnaires. Specifically, we investigated whether participants
who identified more positive inner parts and who showed a
more positive average valence of inner parts also reported
more positive trait affect, and vice versa for negative parts
and affect.
Fig. 1 Design and training exercises of the ReSource study. a Timeline
of training modules (colored areas) and data collection phases (gray
areas, T0–T4) for the three training cohorts (TC1, TC2, TC3) and the
retest control cohorts (RCC1 and RCC2). TC1 and TC2 completed all
three modules and differed only in the order of the Affect and Perspective
module. R in colored boxes indicates retreats. RCC1 andRCC2were split
for logistical reasons into two smaller cohorts but are jointly analyzed.
Both retest control cohorts completed all measurements but did not
receive any training. b Illustration of the core exercises of the three
modules (left to right): Presence (yellow), Affect (red), Perspective
(green)
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By engaging in inner parts work in combination with the
daily perspective dyad, participants effectively practiced taking
the perspective of their own and others’ inner parts. The under-
lying assumption is that familiarizing oneself with one’s own
inner part system will be reflected in discerning a greater num-
ber and variety of different inner parts over time (Schwartz
1995). Especially identifying negative parts seems the more
demanding piece of the process, requiring to overcome an ini-
tial resistance against identifying with negatively valenced
memories and emotions (Holmes 2011). The second and main
goal of the present study, hence, was to investigate the link
between the number of identified negative and positive parts
throughout the Perspective Module (as an indicator of perfor-
mance in perspective taking on self) and the increase in ToM
performance assessed before and after the 3-month perspective
training (as an indicator for the capacity to take the perspective
on others). Specifically, if a better understanding of oneself
does indeed relate to a better understanding of others’ mental
states, identifying a larger number of inner parts in the course of
the training should be accompanied by greater improvements in
ToM performance subsequent to the training. Especially the
identification of negatively valenced inner parts was expected
to be related to a training-related increase in ToM.
Methods
Participants
In total, 332 participants (197 female; mean age = 40.74,
SD = 9.24; age range = 20–55) took part in the ReSource study
(for details of recruitment and assignment, see also Singer et al.
2016) and were randomly assigned to three training cohorts,
TC1, TC2, and TC3 (Ns = 80/81/81), and a retest control cohort
(RCC; N = 90). As illustrated in Fig. 1, TC1 and TC2
underwent three distinct training modules (Presence Module,
Affect Module, Perspective Module) in different orders, TC3
completed the Affect Module only, and RCC was tested at
similar time points as the training cohorts, but without under-
going any form of mental training (for details, see Singer et al.
2016). In the present study, only data from TC1 and TC2 were
included because only participants of these cohorts completed
the Perspective Module. Thirteen participants dropped out be-
fore undergoing this module, data of seven participants was lost
due to technical data-storage difficulties with the custom-made
platform. The remaining sample entailed data of 141 individ-
uals (81 female, mean age = 40.94, SD = 9.39).
Participants were volunteers recruited from the Berlin and
Leipzig area (Germany) via various means, for example, flyers,
local newspaper, and TV and radio announcements between
winter 2012/2013 and winter 2013/2014. All participants
underwent an extensive screening procedure to ensure mental
health (e.g., Major Depression Inventory, Bech et al. 2001;
DIA-X for axis I disorders for DSM-IV, Wittchen and Pfister
1997; Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, SKID-I,
Wittchen et al. 1997), abstinence from drugs and medication
use, and naivety concerning contemplative practices and psycho-
logical measures. For more details about selection criteria, see
Singer et al. (2016). All participants signed informed consent
prior to participation. The study was approved by the Research
Ethics Committee of the University of Leipzig, number 376/12-
ff and the Research Ethics Committee of the Humboldt
University in Berlin, numbers 2013-02, 2013-29, and 2014-10.
The study was registered with the Protocol Registration System
of ClinicalTrials.gov under the title BPlasticity of the
Compassionate Brain^ (Identifier: NCT01833104).
ReSource Project Design and Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, participants underwent a 9-month
mental training program composed of three 3-month modules
(Presence, Affect, and Perspective Module). Each module fo-
cused on cultivating distinct mental and affective capacities,
such as present-moment and interoceptive awareness and at-
tention (Presence Module), loving kindness, gratitude and
compassion, dealing with difficult emotions, and prosocial
motivation (Affect Module), and metacognitive skills and per-
spective taking on self and others (Perspective Module).
Participants practiced a set of meditation exercises, which
have been commonly used for the cultivation of the respective
abilities in contemplative traditions and in Western clinical
psychology (Holmes 2011; Kabat-Zinn 2003; Neff 2011;
Ricard 2008). The meditation exercises combined both tradi-
tional meditation-based as well as more novel dyadic contem-
plative practices (Kok and Singer 2017; Noyes 1998).
Each training module lasted 13 weeks of which the first
8 weeks were used to teaching and developing the respective
contemplative practices. During the final 5 weeks, the respec-
tive abilities (e.g., ToM) were assessed while participants con-
tinued to deepen their practice (Singer et al. 2016). Qualified
meditation teachers with ample experience in contemplative
traditions were specifically recruited for the study and taught
all training modules. At the beginning of each training mod-
ule, participants attended a 3-day retreat under the supervision
of the meditation teachers who introduced participants to the
core exercises of the respective trainings. These core exercises
were then individually practiced on a daily basis for 30 min at
home. In addition, participants attended a weekly session with
the meditation teachers. As noted above, for the present paper,
only data from the Perspective Module are of interest.
The Perspective Module: Inner Parts Work and Dyadic
Practice
The Perspective Module intended to develop metacognitive
skills, detachment from habitual cognitive processes as well
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as perspective taking on self and others. The Perspective
Module began with a 3-day retreat in which participants were
familiarized with the module’s core exercises and continued
with a 3-month practicing period. During this period, partici-
pants attended 2-h weekly sessions in groups of 20 partici-
pants led by two contemplative practice trainers. The core
practices included an Observing-thoughts meditation and a
dyadic practice, the so-called perspective dyad. During the
Observing-thoughts meditation, participants were seated with
their eyes closed and paid special attention to their thinking.
Labels were used to classify the content of the thoughts along
the dimensions of me/other, past/future, or positive/negative.
The objective was to observe thoughts as mental events or
natural phenomena rather than taking them for accurate depic-
tions of reality, to observe thoughts without getting involved
in them, and to de-identify from thoughts, thereby gaining
insight into the workings of the mind and greater flexibility
with regard to successive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
The daily contemplative dyad was based on the identification
of inner parts, influenced by the Internal Family Systemsmod-
el (IFS), a therapeutic approach developed by Schwartz
(1995) and further outlined byHolmes (2011). Our main focus
is on the dyadic practice which focuses on cultivating perspec-
tive taking on self and others and which we will outline in the
following sections.
Inner Parts Work Participants trained perspective taking on
the self through the concept of inner parts (Holmes 2011;
Schwartz 1995). Inner parts according to IFS are relatively
discrete subpersonalities which are each characterized by spe-
cific affective, cognitive, and behavioral patterns (Schwartz
1995). The IFS model loosely classifies inner parts based on
their therapeutic relevance into the categories of Managers,
Exiles, and Firefighters (Schwartz 1995). Managers, for in-
stance, intend to adapt the person to the demands of the exter-
nal world and are often reflected in behavioral and cognitive
patterns aiming at rationally structuring the persons’ everyday
life. Exiles are parts which are burdened with severe, negative
affect due to past traumatizing experiences (Schwartz 1995).
Both Managers and Firefighters attempt to keep Exiles from
entering conscious awareness, e.g., by distracting the person
from the negative or threatening content by overeating or ex-
cessive overworking. Beyond this psychotherapeutic applica-
tion, Holmes (2011) suggested various types of inner parts
relevant for a non-clinical population, such as Pleasure
Parts which are driven by the pleasure principle of immediate
satisfaction of physical needs or Caring Parts which exhibit
feelings of empathy and closeness and a caring motivation. In
an initial reflection phase that took part during the 3-day re-
treat in the beginning of the Perspective Module and that is
typically employed in the introduction of the IFS model, par-
ticipants were asked to identify the inner parts that would be
dominant in exemplary situations, such as playing with a child
or giving an important talk. Each participant registered the
names of six parts which were then employed in the dyadic
practice at week 1. During the following 3-month practice
period, participants met for 13 guided weekly training ses-
sions and could modify their set of six inner parts by replacing
old with new ones at any time.
Dyadic Practice Participants performed a daily, 10-min con-
templative dyadic exercise throughout the Perspective
Module. On the retreat and in the weekly sessions, the per-
spective dyad was performed face-to-face, while during the
practice weeks it was performed online through a voice-based
internet-platform that allowed connecting participants with
each other (for details, see also Singer et al. 2016). During
the dyad, one person took the role of the speaker while the
other was the listener; roles were changed after 5 min. First,
the speaker’s set of six inner parts was presented to the listen-
er. Then, the speaker chose a recent situation that she experi-
enced and shortly described it from the perspective of one of
her inner parts that was randomly selected by a computer
algorithm. The listener listened attentively and then guessed
which one of the speaker’s inner parts was being voiced. On
the side of the speaker, this exercise required imagining a
given situation from the perspective of an inner part that was
not necessarily active during this situation. Hence, the partic-
ipant needed to de-identify from the inner perspective that
actually was activated during the given situation and take a
birds-eye perspective on herself and her inner states. On the
side of the listener, the exercise trained mentalizing on others:
In order to guess correctly which inner part the speaker was
adopting, the listener needed to carefully consider the
expressed thoughts and perceptions of the speaker and infer
the underlying mental states and beliefs. Taken together, the
perspective dyad trained perspective taking on self as well as
perspective taking on others, that is ToM.
Measures
Number of Inner Parts The overall number of different
inner parts registered throughout weeks 1–12 of the train-
ing was assessed for each participant. Week 13 was not
analyzed to avoid interactions with increased demands on
the participants due to preparations for the weekend retreat
and other assessments. Spelling errors in the inner parts’
names were corrected manually. If two inner part names
included the same noun but differed in one adjective, and
they did not occur in the same week, they were classified
as the same rather than different parts. For example, one
participant listed a part called Bthe tolerant understanding
one^ and some weeks later a part called Bthe tolerant
one.^ The latter was interpreted as an abbreviation of
the former and therefore not counted separately.
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Types of Inner Parts In addition to the inner parts per se, we
were interested in how participants’ inner parts related to the
IFS classification (Holmes 2011; Schwartz 1995) and how
participants differed concerning these classifications. All iden-
tified inner parts were classified according to the IFS.1 This
expert rating was carried out by the authors of this study, one
of which is an expert IFS therapist, Tom Holmes. We
employed 12 a-priori defined types described by Holmes
(2011) such as Managers, Protectors or Vulnerable Parts2
and added further types post-hoc to increase differentiation.
Participants’ inner parts which were defined by positive, hap-
py affect such as Bthe enthusiastic child^ or Bthe happy
princess^ were categorized as Happy Parts and parts with an
optimistic attitude such as Bthe positive one^were categorized
as Optimists. The following measures were of interest. First,
we assessed each participant’s propensity to identify the dif-
ferent types of inner parts. For each type, the participants’
average numbers of inner parts were determined over the
course of weeks 1–12. For instance, participant A’s average
set of six parts included three Optimists but no Vulnerable
Part, therefore A’s relative frequency of Optimists was .5 (=
3 parts divided by 6) and of Vulnerable Parts was 0.
Valence of Inner Parts Finally, we assessed the valence of
participants’ inner parts and types of parts. To assess the num-
bers of positively and negatively valenced parts, three inde-
pendent raters (one females, aged 22 and 26, one male, aged
30) rated each of the identified parts (N = 1147) on a seven-
level Likert scale (−3 very negative to 3 very positive). Raters
were naïve to the goal of the study. Valence ratings exhibited
an excellent internal consistency of Cronbach’s Alpha = .93.
A total of 39 parts (only 3.4% of the total amount) were eval-
uated very ambiguously—with a range of minimum 3–4
points on the valence scale—and were excluded from further
valence-oriented analyses. Three measures of valence were
derived. First, each participant’s absolute numbers of positive
and negative parts were assessed. Secondly, the average va-
lence of parts was determined for each participant. Finally,
each of the 14 different type’s mean valence was determined
based on the average valence of all inner parts categorized as a
respective type. In accordance with the IFS model’s focus on
types with extreme affect, we were particularly interested in
participants’ propensity to identify very negative and very
positive types. We therefore also formed extreme groups in-
cluding the types with average valences 1 standard deviation
above and below all types’ mean (M = .15, SD = 1.40). The
negative extreme group covered Worriers, Exhausted Parts,
Vulnerable Parts, Fear Parts, and Hurriers. The positive
extreme group was comprised of Optimists, Happy Parts,
Caring Parts, and Helpers. Each individual’s average frequen-
cies of both extreme groups were determined.
Theory of Mind ToM was assessed using a validated exper-
imental paradigm, the EmpaToM (Kanske et al. 2015), which
was specifically designed to measure high-level ToM perfor-
mance, empathy, and compassion within the same individuals.
In this task, participants watched short videos of people
talking about autobiographic episodes. ToM performance
was assessed by means of multiple-choice questions that re-
quired reasoning on the storytellers’ thoughts, intentions, and
goals (compared to factual reasoning as control condition).
Reaction times (RTs) and error rates were z-transformed, av-
eraged for the ToM condition and combined into one compos-
ite measure of ToM performance, which was successfully val-
idated with existing behavioral measures of ToM performance
(see Kanske et al. 2015). Change in ToM performance
throughout the Perspective Module was assessed by
subtracting participants’ performance scores before and after
the Perspective Module (see also Trautwein et al. under
review). Note that change scores were available for 85% of
the total data since calculating participants’ change scores was
only possible when both pre- and post-scores were available.
For all participants with change scores in ToM performance
and inner part data (N = 117), the amount of inner parts par-
ticipants identified throughout the training was correlated with
their change in ToM performance (composite of RTs and error
rates). In addition, correlations were computed with ToM ac-
curacy scores only (see Trautwein et al. under review).
Trait Affect In order to comprehensively measure participants’
trait affect, we assessed a battery of questionnaires including
the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ; Rothbart et al.
2000; Wiltink et al. 2006), the Beck Depression Inventory
(Bech et al. 2001), the personality inventory by Costa and
McCrae NEO-PI-R (Ostendorf and Angleitner 2004), the
Mental Health Continuum Short Form MHC-SF (Keyes
2009; Lamers et al. 2012), the Positive Affect Negative
Affect Scale PANAS (Krohne et al. 1996; Watson et al.
1988), the Short Affect Intensity Scale SAIS (Geuens and
Pelsmacker 2002), and the Types of Positive Affect Scale
TTPAS (Gilbert et al. 2008). Principal component analysis
was used to reduce the complexity of the data revealing three
factors: Negative Affect, Positive Affect, and Low Arousal
Positive Affect (see Singer et al. 2016, Supplement S1).
Motivation In order to be able to control for participants’
motivation to do the dyadic practice, this measure was
assessed after the completion of the Perspective Module,
using a custom-made questionnaire. Specifically, participants
were asked to retrospectively rate their liking of the dyadic
practice, how much they looked forward to doing the practice,
1 In cases of ambiguous parts, nouns were given priority to adjectives. For
example, for the classification of Bthe ambitious counselor,^ Bcounselor^ was
emphasized.
2 Note that for our non-clinical population, we employed Holmes’ type of
Vulnerable Parts instead of Schwartz’ type of Exiles.
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and how well they could integrate the practice into their daily
lives on a five-level Likert scale.
Results
General Descriptives of Inner Parts and Classification
into Types
Number of Parts The distribution of number and valence of
the identified parts is displayed in Fig. 2, panel a. In total,
participants identified 1147 inner parts. Each participant iden-
tified on average 11 inner parts (range, 6 (required minimum)
to 23; SD = 3.45) over the course of the training.
Types of Parts Seventy-four percent of the identified parts could
be clearly classified into the typical categories of types suggested
by Holmes (2011). As depicted in Fig. 2, panel b, Protectors
were the most frequent types (12%), followed by Managers
and Pleasure Parts (both 11%), Inner Critics (9%), and
Vulnerable Parts (8%). Among the less frequent types were
Exhausted Parts (5%), Caring Parts and Helpers (both 4%),
next toFear Parts andRebels (both 3%). The least frequent types
wereHurriers andWorriers (2%). The inner parts that could not
be classified as prototypical types were classified using our ad-
ditional categories. Among the additional types, Happy Parts
were the most prominent (8%), followed by Optimists (3%).
Valence of Parts Participants identified on average 4.89 nega-
tive and 6.21 positive inner parts (negative parts’ range, 1 to 11;
SD=2.15; positive parts’ range, 2 to 17, SD=2.51). The average
valence of parts participants identified exhibited a slight positiv-
ity bias with a population mean of .31 (range, −.86 to 1.43;
SD = 0.38) on a seven-level Likert scale ranging from −3 to
+3. In terms of extremely valenced types, participants identified
on average 1.16 inner parts belonging to the five highly negative
types (range, 0 to 3, SD = .70) and 1.10 inner parts belonging to
four highly positive types (range, 0 to 2.83, SD = .66).
Correlation Between Valence of Inner Parts and Trait
Affect
In order to test whether the valence of the identified inner parts
could be validated by more established measures of trait
Fig. 2 a Overall numbers of
inner parts identified by
participants during the 12 weeks
of the training are displayed in the
left graph. The right graph shows
participants’ average valence of
all identified parts. b Relative
frequencies of identified types of
inner parts. Types are arranged
and colored according to their
average valence (in parentheses)
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affect, participants’ scores on trait affect factors were correlat-
ed with (a) the average valence of participants’ identified inner
parts and (b) the number of parts belonging to the Bextremely
valenced types^ (most positive types accounting for 19% of
the totality of parts, most negative types accounting for 21%
of the totality of parts).
Average Valence The valence of participants’ parts was sig-
nificantly and positively correlated with scores on the factor
Positive Affect (r = .27, p = .001), thus, the more positively
valenced the inner parts of a participant were, the more posi-
tive trait affect was reported. Correlations with factor scores
on Negative Affect (r = −.14, p = .096) and Positive Affect
Low Arousal (r = .15, p = .076) were not significant.
Number of Extremely Valenced Types Due to non-
normality of the distribution of numbers of extremely
valenced types, Spearman correlation coefficients are reported
in the following. Participants with more inner parts belonging
to the extremely positive type category also exhibited higher
scores on the factors Positive Affect (rho = .29, p = .001) and
Positive Affect Low Arousal (rho = .23, p = .007) (see Fig. 3).
In addition, participants with a higher number of the most
negative types scored higher on the factor Negative Affect
(rho = .33, p < .001) and lower on the factor Positive Affect
(rho = −.20, p = .023). No other correlations were significant
(ps > .16) (see Fig. 3).
Taken together, findings show a coherent relation between
the valence attributed to the inner parts and the dispositional
affect of participants assessed with psychological trait ques-
tionnaires. Hence, the affective pattern revealed by partici-
pants’ inner parts was mirrored by established assessments
of positive and negative trait affect.
Correlation Between Number of Inner Parts and Change
in Theory of Mind Performance
The main goal of the present study was investigating whether
individual differences in improvements in ToM performance
elicited by the Perspective Module (Trautwein et al. under
review) were related to differences in the number of inner
parts participants identified during the course of the training,
that is, the depth of participants’ inner part work. Spearman
correlation coefficients are reported due to the non-normal
distribution of the variable number of participants’ inner parts.
Indeed, participants’ improvement in ToM performance dur-
ing the Perspective Module was significantly correlated with
the overall number of identified parts (rho = .19, p = .046).
Hence, the more inner parts participants identified during the
12 weeks of training, the more they improved in
Fig. 3 Correlations of the
valence of inner parts (left
graphs) and the relative
frequencies of extremely
valenced types of inner parts
(rights graphs) with trait affect. a
The relations for positive affect. b
The relation for negative affect.
Negative types are depicted in
blue; positive types are depicted
in green
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understanding others’ mental states. Interestingly, the valence
of the identified parts was crucial. While identifying and dif-
ferentiating between a greater number of negative inner parts
correlated significantly with improvements in ToM perfor-
mance (rho = .33, p < .001), no relation to the amount of
positive parts was found (rho = .04, p = .676) (see Fig. 4).
When controlling for potential confounding variables such as
differences in baseline ToM performance (ToM performance
before the Perspective Module) and differences in baseline
Negative Affect, the number of negative parts remained a
stable predictor of change in ToM (r = .34, p = .000; r = .26,
p = .005). Also, when controlling for participants’ motivation
to do the perspective dyad (mean = 3.68 (ranging from a
minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5), SD = 1.14), the correlation
between number of negative parts and change in ToM
remained significant (r = .28, p = .003). Finally, we analyzed
the relation between inner parts and ToM accuracy (see
Trautwein et al. under review). This analysis similarly re-
vealed that improvements in ToM accuracy were related to
the amount of identified negative inner parts (rho = .20,
p = .030), while no relation was found for positive parts
(rho = −.03, p = .714) or total number of parts (rho = .09,
p = .333).
In sum, these findings suggest that individual differences in
the propensity to identify inner parts, particularly negatively
valenced inner parts, over the course of the training were pre-
dictive of individual differences in the ability to accurately
understand intentions and beliefs of other people after
3 months of training.
Discussion
Putting ourselves in the shoes of others is a crucial socio-
cognitive skill that is required not only in our everyday social
life, but also with regard to cross-cultural understanding and
mastering global political challenges (Batson et al. 1997;
Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Paal and Bereczkei 2006).
Only recently, studies have shown that adults’ capacity to
represent and infer others’ mental states can be enhanced
through contemplative mental training programs (Mascaro
et al. 2013; Schurz et al. 2014; Trautwein et al. under
review). The processes that facilitate these improvements are
yet unknown, however. We investigated whether understand-
ing other people may be inherently linked to understanding
oneself. Having more complex and fine-grained knowledge
about one’s own emotional, cognitive, and behavioral facets
is a useful capacity in everyday life and therapeutical settings
(Holmes 2011; Schwartz 1995) and may help to better under-
stand the mental states of others. Accordingly, the main goal
of the present study was to investigate whether learning to
better understand oneself is related to improvements in the
cognitive understanding of others.
This question was addressed in the scope of a longitudinal
mental training study (Singer et al. 2016), the ReSource
Project, in which a large representative participant sample
underwent a 3-month Perspective Module, in which
metacognitive abilities and perspective taking on self and
others were practiced. Specifically, participants performed a
daily 10-min dyadic exercise with another person and prac-
ticed both identifying and taking the perspective of inner per-
sonality parts rooted in inner parts work of the IFS model
(Holmes 2011; Schwartz 1995) and taking the perspective of
another person (Kok and Singer 2017).
Results revealed that (a) participants identified inner parts
that could largely be classified according to the established
typology used in IFS (Holmes 2011; based on Schwartz
1995), (b) the affective valence of participants’ identified in-
ner parts could be validated with established measures of dis-
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Fig. 4 Correlations of the number of inner parts identified by participants and their improvement in ToM performance. Correlations with negative parts
are depicted in blue, correlations with positive parts are depicted in green
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between greater numbers of inner parts, especially negatively
valenced parts, was associated with greater improvements in
ToM capacity after the mental training. Note that the assess-
ment of ToM performance with a laboratory task (Kanske
et al. 2015) was completely independent in content and time
of assessment from the daily mental exercises practiced during
the Perspective Module.
Since IFS is typically used in therapeutic contexts (Holmes
2011; Schwartz 1995; Shadick et al. 2013) rather than in psy-
chological empirical research, we first aimed at investigating
several fundamental features of participants’ inner parts, such
as how many and which types were identified in the course of
the study. On average, participants reported 11 distinct inner
parts throughout the perspective training. The majority of in-
ner parts identified by our participant sample could be catego-
rized according to the typology described by Holmes (2011).
Hence, the Internal Family Systemsmodel which originated in
psychotherapy (Schwartz 1995) could account well for cogni-
tive and affective patterns exhibited by healthy adults ranging
from 20 to 55 years. Furthermore, we could validate our new
approach with prototypical psychological trait questionnaires.
Individuals who identified a larger amount of strongly nega-
tive types of parts during the PerspectiveModule also reported
more negative trait affect and, accordingly, individuals who
identified a higher number of positive inner parts had a higher
disposition for positive affective states as measured with clas-
sical trait questionnaires. Similarly, the more positive the av-
erage valence of participants’ inner parts was, the more posi-
tive trait affect they reported. This coherent correlation pattern
between types of identified inner parts during daily contem-
plative exercise and widely used psychological dispositional
affect measures supports the view of inner parts as valid con-
structs in the assessment of individual differences in person-
ality. Future research may focus on the motivational founda-
tions of inner parts and the relationship between inner parts to
other motives, personality traits, and attitudes.
Most importantly, the finding of a significant correlation
between the number of participants’ inner parts identified
throughout the 3-month training and their improvements in
high-level ToM performance clearly suggests that the degree
of familiarization with one’s own internal dynamics and affec-
tive and cognitive patterns is linked to improvements in un-
derstanding the mental states of other people. This interplay
between taking one’s own and others’ perspectives is in line
with neuroimaging studies reporting a neural overlap between
brain regions that are reliably activated during both processes
(Lombardo et al. 2010; Mitchell and Phillips 2015) and
mimics similar theories in the domain of affective empathic
responses (Singer 2012; Lamm and Singer 2010) that show a
relationship between the degree of understanding ones’ own
emotions and the degree of empathizing with others’ affective
states (Bird et al. 2010; Lamm and Singer 2010; Steinbeis and
Singer 2014). Our findings further add to an idea put forward
by Dimaggio et al. (2008) that better self-reflection can lead to
greater awareness of others. Another important theoretical
framework based in philosophy (Goldman 1995a, b) and later
developed by neuroscientists (Gallese and Goldman 1998) has
been the simulationist account which posits that our capacity
to understand another’s mind relies on our privileged access to
our own mental states (Goldman 2006). In accordance, be-
coming aware of a greater variety of our own different inner
parts associated to patterns of affective, bodily, and cognitive
states may increase our ability to identify similar mental states
in other people.
Finally, we were interested in how the valence of identified
inner parts was related to improved ToM performance. While
improvements in mentalizing on others were generally related
to identifying a high number of parts, this correlation was
driven by the amount of negatively valenced parts and absent
for positive inner parts. This result is in line with IFS theory,
suggesting that vulnerable, anxious, or doubtful affective
states are more difficult to become aware of in one’s own
experience, because seeing them requires overcoming an ini-
tial resistance against these painful affects (Holmes 2011;
Schwartz 1995). Accordingly, participants who identified a
greater amount of negative parts throughout the training may
have engaged in a more extensive search of their inner parts,
even the difficult ones, and thus engaged in the inner part
work more thoroughly, dedicating more energy and attention
to their practice. Clinical psychology has generally regarded
accepting—as opposed to avoiding—negative emotions as
beneficial for mental health (Davis et al. 2015; Williams and
Lynn 2011). According to the IFS model, accepting previous-
ly unacceptable parts of oneself and others plays a central role
for the therapeutic success (Schwartz 2013). Interestingly, ex-
periential avoidance—conceptualized as the opposite of ac-
ceptance (Williams and Lynn 2011)—has been found to in-
volve reduced ToM capacities in psychiatric patients
(Vanwoerden et al. 2015). Vanwoerden and colleagues argued
that an unwillingness to contact uncomfortable experiences
may result in a lack of integrated memories of negative states
which may, in turn, disable the attribution of such negative
states in others. Similarly, participants who accepted and
allowed uncomfortable experiences in themselves may have
increased their differentiation between negative mental states,
which allowed for a better understanding of others’ mental
states.
In the following, we will discuss in more detail the poten-
tial mechanisms that may underlie the relation between inner
parts work as an example of understanding oneself and the
enhanced socio-cognitive capacity to understand others.
Firstly, one contributing factor may be participants’ discovery
of affective and cognitive mental patterns that formerly had
not been accessible or represented. This recognition and
forming of more elaborated representations of diverse mental
patterns may have enabled the more differentiated attribution
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of similar patterns to others. During the training sessions, self-
exploration was explicitly encouraged by targeted exercises
and participants were asked to detect new inner parts in their
experience of themselves both during the exercises and at
home (Singer et al. 2016). As the positive correlation between
the number of parts identified during training and increased
ToM performance after the training suggests, the discovery of
new self-aspects, and particularly aspects that may seem dif-
ficult at first, plays a key role in the ability to understand other
people’s mental states.
Secondly, participants may have arrived at generally en-
hanced attention to and processing of mental states per se.
To date, all training programs which could successfully im-
prove ToM performance have in some form guided partici-
pants to focus their attention on mental states (e.g., by
discussing these phenomena in a group or with a trainer; see
Cavallini et al. 2015; Lecce et al. 2014a, b). Similar processes
may be elicited by inner parts work, which explicitly empha-
sizes to focus on mental states as well as their fluidity.
Thirdly, as Schwartz (1995) spells out, learning about the
concept of inner parts fosters a view of self and other not as
single units but as multiplicities of aspects. This view may
reduce the habitual tendency to perceive others as overly con-
sistent across varying situations (Sande et al. 1988) and thereby
aid in increasing flexibility and accuracy in the understanding
of the complexity of other persons’ different inner mental states.
Fourth, the improvement of ToM performance may be spe-
cifically boosted by the contemplative perspective dyad in
which participants trained to willfully identify with an inner
part and then take the perspective of that inner part to recount a
certain situation from the past day (Kok and Singer 2017). In
so doing, participants needed to decouple from the situation
how it was actually experienced as well as from the real inner
part(s) that was active in this situation and recount it from the
perspective of another part, possibly contrary in style from the
one that had been actually prevalent in the given situation. As
an example, the aversive situation of receiving a parking ticket
had to be told from the happy inner child’s perspective. Such
Bdecoupling^ from experienced reality has been advocated to
be a basic process needed for taking the perspective of another
person (Frith and Frith 2003). Accordingly, participants who
came up with more inner parts also trained to take the perspec-
tive on a greater variety of different inner parts in unusual
contexts, and got better in decoupling. Future studies could
help identify whether neuronal networks underlying individ-
ual differences in ToM performance are shared with those
underlying individual differences in identifying and taking
the perspective of self-related inner parts as practices in the
present study. In addition, to conclusively describe the (com-
bination of) processes that underlie the beneficial effect of
learning to understand oneself for understanding others, future
studies will need to perform more selective manipulations, for
instance by separately training the decoupling from a given
situation or viewpoint on the one hand and the more elaborate
understanding of internal dynamics among inner parts in self
and others on the other hand.
In sum, the present study clearly suggests that inner parts
work and training to flexibly take perspective on self-related
inner mental states is not only promising in therapeutic set-
tings, but also in non-clinical settings aiming to foster psycho-
logical health and social intelligence as well as for fundamen-
tal research in the fields of personality and social psychology
and social neurosciences.We demonstrated that healthy adults
between 20 and 55 years could easily identify prototypical
inner parts such as Bthe inner manager^ or Bthe inner child.^
The assessment of these inner parts was further validated on
the basis of participants’ affective personality styles as mea-
sured through a battery of classical psychological trait mea-
sures. Importantly, learning to identify a larger variety of in-
ternal personality aspects was predictive of training-related
improvements in one of the most critical interpersonal
skills—flexibly and accurately inferring and representing oth-
er people’s mental states, that is ToM performance.
Interestingly, especially learning to identify negative aspects
of the self was predictive of a better understanding of other
people. This insight could prove important in an increasingly
complex and interconnected world where taking the view of
others, especially those from different cultures or with differ-
ent religious backgrounds, becomes ever more difficult—and
ever more necessary. Targeted trainings that aim at improving
people’s capacity to understand themselves and put them-
selves more easily in the shoes of others could help fostering
the care and support that is needed to deal with the global
challenges of today.
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